There is a common belief that an influenza pandemic not only is inevitable, but that it is imminent. It is further believed by some, and dramatized by a 2006 made-for-television-movie, that such a pandemic will herald an end to life as we know it. Are such claims hyperboles, or does a pandemic represent the most significant threat to public health in the new millennium? Any potential effects of a disease on a population are mediated not only through the pathophysiological mechanisms of the disease itself, but through the psychological and behavioral reactions that such a disease might engender. It is the purpose of this paper to explore the potential psychological and behavioral reactions that may accompany an influenza pandemic. 
Introduction
In the purest sense, the terms "plague", "epidemic", and "pandemic" refer to the spread of a given disease; these terms often signify something more than theirPreparing for an Influenza Pandemic that although people may be facing the same fears and unknown health risk during any given epidemic, there are considerable individual differences in the extent of anxiety and coping strategies used. Furthermore, the anxiety level and coping strategies of individuals can change over the life-course of the epidemic. 4 Manderscheid provides a general rule of thumb for the types and distribution of psychological ramifications that will likely attend such a crisis-one-third of the population unaffected, one-third hyper vigilant; onethird immobilized. 18 Hyper-vigilance can manifest itself in the form of sympathetic arousal due to fear, insomnia, and anxiety. For the purposes of this discussion, the presence of severe feelings of rejection, the post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), and/or depression will be markers of Mandersheid's "immobilization"
While estimates such as Mandersheid's may be helpful to convey a general idea of what to anticipate, actual numbers under each response category will differ by time, location, disease, and measurement methods. For example, variation around these approximate estimates has been observed in several case studies. A survey of survivors of the 1995 Ebola outbreak in the Democratic Republic of the Congo noted that more than one-third of the survivors reported that they felt rejected by society following their convalescence; another 40% reported no psychological effects from the trauma. 19 In another case, a severe Legionnaires Disease outbreak in Japan was linked with "social dysfunction" in only 12% of cases and "severe depression" in 3%. 20 A study of the psychological impact of SARS in Hong Kong noted that nearly 18% reported symptoms related to PTSD, anxiety, and depression. 21 Such disease/epidemic-specific variation in post-trauma psychological reactions may be explained in the differential distribution of factors that have been associated with adverse mental outcomes in the literature (Table 1) . 4, [21] [22] [23] [24] Severe acute respiratory syndrome and related diseases possess characteristics that render them particularly prone to stigmatization. One study subsequent to the SARS outbreak illustrated how nearly all of the residents of the Amoy Gardens complex (the first officially recognized site of the SARS outbreak in Hong Kong) were stigmatized in some way or another. This included being shunned, insulted, marginalized, and rejected in the domains of work, interpersonal relationships, use of services, and schooling. Residents attributed the stigma to government mismanagement, contagiousness, the mysteriousness of the SARS virus, and alarmist media reports. 25 On the other side of the globe, in Toronto, Asian hospital patients reported stigmatization and racist reactions toward them, due to the Chinese origin of the outbreak. 26 
Psychological Contagion
The term "contagion" typically has been associated with medical diseases, emotional and behavioral reactions, and sociological phenomena. Regardless of its context, contagion implies a surge or spread of events. From a medical perspective, mostly in relation to infectious agents, contagion refers to transmission of a disease by direct or indirect contact. From a psychological or sociological perspective, the concept of contagion was first introduced by the French that influenza A/H5N1, a highly virulent strain of influenza, is a potential pandemic virus if it mutates into a virus capable of interpersonal transmission. 6, 7 Some believe that the influenza virus causing the pandemic of 1918 began as an avian influenza strain. [8] [9] [10] As of mid-March 2008, there had been a total of 373 confirmed cases of bird-to-human H5N1 infection, of which 236 died (a case-fatality rate of 63%). The span of human transmission from birds as of May 2008 involves 14 countries: China, Thailand, Vietnam, Myanmar, Laos, Indonesia, Cambodia, Turkey, Iraq, Egypt, Azerbaijan, Nigeria, Pakistan, and Djibouti. Together, Indonesia and Vietnam accounted for roughly two-thirds of the cases. 11 This relatively small number of cases may lead one to conclude that, in the words of the US Department of Health and Human Services Secretary Mike Leavitt, pandemic influenza constitutes "one of the most important public health issues our Nation and the world faces…" is an overstatement. 12 However, when examining federal government projections of the potential human cost of pandemic flu for the US alone, one begins to understand the magnitude of the threat. 13 These projections assume that no matter the virulence, there will be no difference in the number of people who fall ill (90 million people, or 30% of the population) and the number seeking outpatient treatment (45 million). The projection assumes a moderately virulent strain (such as that of the influenza in 1957) would lead to approximately 865,000 hospitalizations and 209,000 deaths. However, a scenario involving a strain of severe virulence (akin to the 1918 strain) projects 9.9 million hospitalizations and 1.9 million deaths. In addition to these human costs, the government estimates that 30% of all workers in the US would fall ill, missing an average of three weeks of work. This would have substantial economic costs, including a subsequent decrease in the national gross domestic product of 5%. 14 Although US governmental agencies and others have offered a sobering picture of waves of infection pummeling the nation over several months, thus closing schools, curtailing commerce, and producing an economic loss estimated to be greater than that wreaked by Hurricane Katrina. 15, 16 What remains less clear is the nature and scope of the psychological consequences of a pandemic. This invites the question, just what are the psychological ramifications of a worst-case pandemic avian influenza? While the answer is not certain, past experiences, particularly with the recent outbreaks of SARS, may provide clues about what to expect and what to do. One thing is considered certain in the scientific community: there will be another influenza pandemic. Therefore, it would be prudent to be prepared in order to prevent and mitigate psychological morbidity in its wake.
Psychological Effects in the General Population
After an outbreak of bubonic plague in 1994, news sources reported that an estimated 600,000 people fled the city of Surat, India in one night by horse carriage, ox cart, train, or even on foot. 17 Fear had so gripped the city that the only choice for many was to flee. Why do some plagues promote a mass exodus, while others do not? Experience has shown to some of the effective coping mechanisms to foster during a pandemic.
Psychological Effects on Vulnerable Populations
No discussion of the psychological impact of disease epidemics can be considered thorough without a pointed consideration of vulnerable populations. Broad-scale public health crises have a disproportionately negative effect on selected sub-populations. Generalizing from a heterogeneous range of naturally occurring and intentionally provoked disasters throughout the world, the pre-event characteristics listed in Figure 1 identify groups that may be considered particularly at-risk for untoward psychological sequelae during and following an influenza epidemic.
The vulnerability of these sub-groups has been confirmed by numerous investigators. [31] [32] [33] [34] However, there are exceptions and complexities that play into preparedness planning. First, it must be acknowledged that these inferences are drawn from non-epidemic disasters. Second, there are incident nuances, cultural differences, and personal traits that interact in influential ways, and thus warrant careful consideration. For example, Norris and colleagues demonstrated that the sub-group of a sample of persons from Poland, Mexico, and the United States most affected by the stress of disasters due to naturally-occurring hazards was actually middle-aged Americans (ages 31-65)-a finding hypothesized to be related to their multiple roles and responsibilities. 32, 34 Moreover, personality factors play a vital role in predicting whose psychological health will prove to be the most or least resilient during a crisis. For example, irrespective of socio-economic level, people assessed to have an internal "locus of control" cope better with all crises and catastrophes because they view themselves as being in command of their lives and destinies. 35 Conversely, those with an external locus of control view themselves as victims of fate with little perceived self-efficacy in being able to influence many life events and outcomes. 36, 37 
Psychological Effects in Healthcare Workers
During an epidemic, healthcare workers often are looked to as pillars of strength and sources of comfort by their community. However, epidemics can create a serious moral dilemma among these same healthcare workers. They, like all humans, have an innate desire to preserve their own life, as well as those of their family. Some healthcare workers may be tempted to take the course of action of the famous Greek physician Galen, who fled Rome when it was struck by a plague near the end of the second century. 2 This phenomenon has manifested itself also in recent times, when up to 80% of the private physicians of Surat, India fled the sociologist Gustave Le Bon to account for the emotionally charged "collective mind" of people in a crowd. In essence, it represents a surge of events, both behavioral and psychological, that threaten safety and security. 27 Contagion fuels emotions and behaviors. It can demoralize with anger, paranoia, and fear. These emotions may drive behaviors that can include evacuation panic, resistance to public health measures, overburdening of hospitals and clinicians, blaming of the government, and abandoning responsibilities to families and jobs. Destroying community cohesion, this cascade of effects eventually can cause fragmentation of even the most basic governmental and private sector services at a time when communities need to be at their strongest. As time passes, the lethality of the original event can be dwarfed by painful awareness of an inappropriate or inadequate response to the attack. Pandemic influenza, like SARS, has significant potential for psychological contagion.
It was shown in the wake of SARS that the perceived threat of the epidemic caused significant stress to many individuals from countries that were not directly affected. 28 This stress and fear can cause non-affected countries to compound the adverse impacts of any epidemic or pandemic on a country by imposing quarantines or closing borders. During the 1994 Surat plague, the Gulf States, where an estimated 1.5 million Indians were earning their livelihood, severed all links with, and forced a commercial quarantine on, India. Ramalingaswami concluded that India's tourism industry was immediately damaged by the plague. 16 Likewise, SARS showed that infectious disease epidemics and modern international air travel are intricately interlinked. As Wilder-Smith states, "Travelers [were the people] primarily affected in the early stages of the outbreak, travelers became vectors of the disease, and finally, travel and tourism themselves became the victims". 29 Not all the psychological effects of infectious outbreaks are negative. For instance, following the Ebola outbreak, survivors generally reported that one of the positive psychological effects was an increased faith in God. 19 Likewise, a study of the general population in Hong Kong demonstrated that even in the presence of some of the definite adverse psychological responses due to SARS, there also was an increase in aspects of social cohesion among certain groups. The study noted that >60% of the respondents stated that they cared more about their family members' feelings and, in return, about one-third felt their family members and/or friends were more supportive. Furthermore, about two-thirds of the respondents paid more attention to their mental health, such as by taking time to rest or engaging in exercise. 30 These observations may provide a clue as 40 In between these extremes were healthcare workers in a hospital in Singapore, approximately 20% of whom had signs of PTSD. 41 Nurses were identified as being more affected than doctors or other healthcare workers. 22, 42 Other determinants of psychological distress are listed in Table 2 . 26, 42 Chong and colleagues 40 identified two psychological phases associated with the SARS outbreak: (1) the initial phase; and (2) the repair phase. 39 The initial phase, when the infection was spreading rapidly, was characterized by feelings of extreme vulnerability and uncertainty, and was dominated by somatic and cognitive symptoms of anxiety. The repair phase, when the infection was beginning to be controlled, was dominated by feelings of depression and avoidance. Studies also have helped to identify those coping strategies that help to reduce psychological morbidity. These include: (1) having clear directives; (2) feeling well-equipped and protected; (3) having the ability to give feedback to and feeling supported by management; (4) having support from colleagues and family; (5) having someone to talk with; and (6) having religious convictions. 26, 41 A recent study conducted in the US has documented that nearly half of local health department workers would likely not report to duty during a pandemic. 43 However, study data also illumined key factors (i.e., perceptual, cognitive, and psychological) that workers identified as critical for increasing the probability of reporting. Specifically, respondents underscored the importance of assuring that personnel have: (1) a good understanding of the risk scenario; (2) confidence that the organization will provide appropriate protective equipment, timely information, and psychological support; (3) belief in having been well-trained to cope with emergency responsibilities, including the ability to communicate risk to others; and (4) the perception that their personal roles within the settings are important. The latter issue is especially important for support of clinical staff. Mandersheid emphasizes that to ensure the continuance of critical infrastructure, one must focus on systematic methods for the clear identification, training, and cross training of essential personnel. 18 
Gaps in Surveillance Systems
Although public health agencies and healthcare organizations have improved their overall preparedness for infectious disease outbreaks (and bioterrorism), gaps remain in state and local disease surveillance systems.There is an urgent need for the points of detection for influenza-like illness outbreaks and associated mental health problems to be repositioned "upstream" from hospital emergency departments to outpatient and community-based settings. Promising data on the feasibility of such sentinel surveillance systems for application to mental health have begun to emerge across the globe from New York City (NYC), where coded outpatient visit data are transferred daily to the NYC health department for trend analysis, 44 to Cambodia, where rural communes provide timely health information gathered by lay volunteers trained to detect not only suspected outbreaks and major health problems, but also "life events" that may have psychological ramifications. 45 city during the aforementioned 1994 Surat Plague. 17, 38 On the other hand, there is the strong call of duty mandated by the healthcare professions. During the Black Plague, the personal physician of Pope Clement VI , Guy de Chauliac, embodied this value, disclosing, "as for me, to avoid infamy, I did not dare absent myself, but with continued fear treated myself as much as I could". 2 A study in a Toronto hospital found that some even over-compensate in this respect, and worked until their peers or supervisors sensed they were working too hard and provided "permission" to rest. 26 Even when healthcare workers chose not to flee, the dilemma many healthcare workers faced following the SARS outbreak was the conflict between their professional roles as care providers and their protective roles as parents who feared exposing their families to infection. 26 This profound dilemma, coupled with their proximity to the disease, arguably may make healthcare workers even more vulnerable to adverse psychological effects than the general population.
The healthcare community's experience with the SARS epidemic is a harbinger of what will likely be observed during a pandemic flu outbreak. There are certain similarities between SARS, the first infectious disease to emerge in the 21 st century, and a potential pandemic of influenza, most obvious of which is the mode of transmission. The SARS outbreak was unique because it was highly concentrated in healthcare settings, and 20% of the 8,400 infected individuals were healthcare workers. 24, 39 As with the general population, the psychological experiences of healthcare workers during the epidemic varied considerably by time and location. On one extreme were the healthcare workers in a hospital in East Taiwan, which discontinued emergency and outpatient services to prevent a possible nosocomial outbreak. Only 5% of healthcare workers there suffered from an acute stress disorder, and only 9% reported reluctance to work or considered resignation. 39 On the other extreme
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Figure 1-Psychosocial characteristics and groups at risk for negative psychological problems defined as self-imposed insulation, wherein naturally occurring groups, such as families, residential student groups, and even work groups, physically isolate themselves for a brief period of time in the wake of some threat to their physical and/or psychosocial health. The self-imposed insulation would serve as a complement to the more aggressive quarantine and last only as long as there was a threat of harmful biogenic contagion. Saathoff and Everly have written on the concept of shielding as it applies to psychological contagion. They note, "While we believe that shielding is an imperative public health intervention for physical health (as in responding to biological agents), we also believe that shielding represents an imperative public health intervention for psychological health". 50 Healthcare Center Preparation Nearly 42% of Taiwanese nurses admitted that they may refuse to provide care in the event of an influenza outbreak because they doubted that their hospitals would have sufficient infection control measures and equipment to prevent nosocomial infections in their working environment. 51 One study asked nurses what hospitals could do to support their ability to cope during public health emergencies; 52 their recommendations are summarized in Table 3 . The overlap of factors previously reported by Balicer and colleagues to enhance likelihood of public health workers reporting for duty is noteworthy. 43 
Clear and Timely Communication
Both the press and governments were slow to strike the right balance between timely and frequent risk communication and placing risk in the proper context during the SARS outbreak. 29 Too frequent communications can cause psychological distress, as they often may contradict each other due to being hastily prepared. Conversely, there also is a risk of communicating too infrequently, which may lead to the spread of false rumors and unfounded fears. Furthermore, risk miscommunication by the media can rapidly amplify stigma toward an unfamiliar illness. 25 Information should be readily accessible to, and communication should be a priority among, healthcare staff (Table 3) . Preparing clear and accurate messages on pandemic influenza beforehand as much as is feasible, and including such messages in disaster plans and trainings can help reduce the number of damaging contradictory, post-crisis messages.
Informed and Authoritative Leadership
Healthcare workers and the general population look to leaders for clear and authoritative instructions. Government and hospital leaders should do everything they can to ensure that their decisions are well informed and confident.
Since an avian influenza epidemic would create the most serious physical and psychological hardships for the socially and economically disadvantaged, there is a need to have the capability of identifying and meeting the psychological needs of the most vulnerable whose access to services would likely be worsened under a pandemic scenario. At-risk sub-groups that deserve special attention among the disadvantaged population include: (1) children; (2) single mothers; (3) pregnant women; (4) political minorities; (5) non-English speaking immigrants; (6) the elderly without family or a support system; (7) the infirm and homebound of any age; (8) residents of nursing homes, inmates of correctional systems; and (9) poultry farmers, their families, and workers (because of the high-likelihood of their isolation and stigmatization).
Recommendations
Several themes have emerged from the cited studies that can be helpful in mitigating the mental health impacts of an influenza pandemic. These include the importance of healthcare center preparation, clear and timely communication, informed and authoritative leadership, enhanced mental health surveillance, and the utilization of a multi-component continuum of care that seamlessly integrates mental health services. 46, 47 What About Quarantine? Two commonly used measures to control an epidemic are the isolation and treatment of symptomatic individuals and the quarantining of individuals who have a high risk of having been infected. Quarantine must be approached only after great thought for its implications. Many feel that SARS and other epidemics were contained successfully globally by instituting widespread quarantine measures. 48 However, mass quarantine can have significant social, psychological, and economic ramifications, and may not even result in the detection of many infected individuals. 49 One study examined the psychological effects on a group of individuals who were quarantined due to SARS in Toronto, Canada. The study discovered symptoms of PTSD and depression in 28.9% and 31.2% of respondents, respectively. This same study concluded that the longer the duration of the quarantine, the higher was the likelihood of observing PTSD symptoms. 48 In light of this, the use of quarantine should be considered with caution. Specifically, research shows that quarantine may be appropriate only when medical isolation is ineffective, when there is significant asymptomatic transmission, and if the asymptomatic period is neither very long nor very short. 49 
Shielding as a Complement to Quarantine?
The concept of shielding represents but one element in an overall integrated national response plan to a pandemic, but may serve to complement quarantine. Shielding may be Table 2 -Determinants of adverse psychological outcomes among healthcare workers Preparing for an Influenza Pandemic ing more intervention. Third, the outcomes of psychosocial interventions should be evaluated from surveillance data as they are implemented. Additionally, it potentially is beneficial to consider indigenous community resources that might be candidates for establishing sentinel surveillance capabilities. Lay health advisors, in general, and the faith community, in particular, working in partnership with local health departments and academic health centers, would seem to be elements for an ideal collaborative approach for actualizing this vision. Moreover, there are established partnership models upon which to base the design of pilot programs for early detection of physical and mental health problems. [54] [55] [56] [57] Wherever the locus of identification of epidemic-driven psychosocial problems, the needs of the perennially disenfranchised must be considered. A seemingly coherent approach to assuring social justice for the disadvantaged has been articulated recently. 58 Here, it is adapted in a slightly revised form in a three-part formula for application to the field of psychosocial health: (1) identify and enumerate those groups most likely to be disproportionately affected (psychologically) by a pandemic; (2) engage the disadvantaged groups or their representatives in a preparedness planning process; and (3) work to assure that (systems for meeting) identified psychosocial needs in the mutuallydeveloped plans are addressed and incorporated into the pandemic preparedness and response plans of key local, state, and federal agencies.
Integrated Continuum of Care
From the seminal work of Raphael to the recent recommendations of Everly and Mitchell, there is consensus that an integrated multi-component continuum of care is essential to the strategic and tactical success of responding to a pandemic. 46, 47 An integrated continuum of care must seamlessly integrate mental health with physical health serThey should provide healthcare workers with a forum to express their concerns and needs. Maunder and colleagues describe the actions taken by administrators of one hospital in Toronto during the SARS epidemic. 26 This hospital serves as an excellent case study of effective leadership during a biological crisis (Table 4) .
A matter of critical but perhaps underappreciated importance in assuring that the psychological needs of organizational and community members will be met, is "continuity of leadership". Ideally, an organization and its directors anticipate and plan for leadership transitions. However, leadership loss can be sudden and may occur under a rapidly emerging epidemic scenario. Thus, there is a need for organizations to have in place contingency emergency-succession plans that spell out those most qualified to assume the leadership position(s) and to provide the necessary preparation for such a contingency. Moreover, because of the escalating rate of "graying" of organizational leaders in the country, 53 it is prudent for all organizations to develop a more comprehensive, long-term plan for replacement of senior management.
Enhanced Mental Health Surveillance
Having sufficient data on the psychological situation during a pandemic influenza epidemic will ensure more appropriate and timely interventions. Sim and Chua propose three key considerations for a psychosocial surveillance system during an epidemic. 24 First, it must be systemic. In hospitals, such a system should incorporate patients and healthcare workers (and their families), non-medical staff, and medical colleagues in the community. Second, because the psychological impact may persist or evolve over time, surveillance must be longitudinal. This will help identify important determinants of psychological distress as well as the protective effects of certain coping strategies, with potential application in early identification of cases requir- (informed by grim experiences with previous epidemics), there is one significant difference between many of the past outbreaks and a potential influenza, namely, that the agent itself is not unknown. Since an influenza pandemic is almost certainly coming, countries can prepare now. The integration of mental health care into public health preparedness for infectious outbreaks is a critical step in planning for communities, hospitals, and outpatient care systems. 38 National, state, and local governments, as well as the private healthcare sector, all have a role to play in achieving this goal. Pro-active mental health planning is essential and requires engagement of citizens in order to reflect priorities and values of the affected community. Without planning, the psychological and social toll of pandemic can turn that crisis into catastrophe. A proper plan not only will provide necessary public health relief, but also will facilitate recovery.
vices, a notion historically foreign in public health applications subsequent to large-scale disasters or public health challenges.
Conclusions
Fear caused by the H5N1 influenza virus easily could be heightened to levels above those that occurred during the SARS outbreak. The psychological well-being of healthcare workers is crucial to a successful response to such a crisis. If it is ignored, those whose services that are needed the most at that time may be unavailable. One study of nurses' willingness to care for patients with avian flu in Taiwan found that only 57% of the nurse participants indicated that they were willing to care for patients infected with avian influenza. 51 Moreover, health workers often are implicated in the nosocomial spread of influenza. 59 Despite the challenges of a prospective pandemic influenza
